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On January 23, 2012, in United States v. Jones, 1 the United States 
Supreme Court handed down. the surprisingly unanimous opinion that 
the warrantless attachment of a GPS tracking device to a private au-
tomobile violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Just four months prior, following a moot court proceeding con-
ducted at the William and Mary School of Law's annual Supreme 
Court Preview, a panel of distinguished lawyers, journalists, and law 
professors voted almost unanimously that, based on current Supreme 
Court precedent, there was no such violation. How could the panel, 
said to be selected from the "nation's leading legal scholars ... [and] 
lawyers who have argued a combined total of more than 200 cases 
before the Court,"2 have been so wrong? Doubtless the participants 
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1 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 
2 Institute of Bill of Rights Law, IBRL Hosts Annual Supreme Court Pre-
view Sept. 23-24, WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCHOOL (Sept. 20, 2011), 
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read the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit panel's August 6, 
2010 opinion that favored Mr. Jones, certainly they were privy to the 
winning arguments that Jones had made before that court,3 and no 
doubt they had the benefit of the exchange of opinions in the court of 
appeals which had denied the Government's motion for a rehearing. 4 
Perhaps more importantly, available to the moot court participants 
was the Government's petition seeking Supreme Court review, and 
Jones' s Response. In its petition, the Government presented only one 
question for decision: "Whether the warrantless use of a tracking de-
vice on [respondent's] vehicle to monitor its movements on public 
streets violated the Fourth Amendment."5 The Jones response pre-
sented two issues, the first of which was only a more detailed varia-
tion of the question presented by the Government. The second ques-
tion, however, was new: "Whether the government violated respond-
ent's Fourth Amendment rights by installing the OPS tracking device 
on his vehicle without a valid warrant and without his consent."6 
I. THE SUPREME COURT DEFINES THE ISSUE AT THE 
PETITION STAGE: PROPERTY, NOT JUST PRIVACY 
Jones' s claim that the installation of the OPS tracking device was 
an unreasonable search because the Government agents had trespassed 
http://law.wm.edu/news/ stories/2011/ibrl-hosts-annual-supreme-court-preview-sept.-
23-24 .php. 
3 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh 'gen 
bane denied sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The 
Court of Appeals decision also resolved the appeal of Lawrence Maynard, a co-
defendant of Mr. Jones in the conspiracy case, whose conviction was upheld. The 
panel consisted of the opinion's author, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg (appointed by 
President Ronald Reagan), Judge David S. Tatel (appointed by President Bill Clin-
ton), and Judge Thomas B. Griffith (appointed by President George W. Bush). Bio-
graphical Directory of Federal Judges, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/BiographicalDirectoryOfJudges.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012). 
4 The United States' Petition for Reconsideration and the Jones opposition 
brief was appended to the Government's Petition for Certiorari. See Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, Appendix at 45a-52a, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 
1462758. Although the petition for rehearing en bane was denied, Chief Judge David 
B. Sentelle and Circuit Judges Janice Rogers Brown and Brett M. Kavanaugh would 
have granted the petition. Jones, 625 F.3d at 767. 
5 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at I (emphasis added). 
6 Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL2263361 (emphasis added). Jones's counsel Stephen C. 
Leckar, Esq. recruited former acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger to join him as 
co-counsel on the briefs at both the petition and merits stages, but Mr. Leckar argued 
the case for Mr. Jones on November 8, 2011. 
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onto Jones's private property was only briefly sketched out in the last 
page and a half of Jones's response brief. However, Jones expressly 
asked the Court to "also grant review of th[ is] alternative argument 
[which] Jones raised in the D.C. Circuit ... that the court had no oc-
casion to resolve."7 The question whether the installation itself was 
constitutional, Jones contended, turned on a '"property-based Fourth 
Amendment argument' . . . antecedent to the question on which the 
government seeks review."8 In support, Jones cited D.C. Circuit Court 
Judge Kavanaugh who, in dissent to the court of appeals' denial of the 
Government's petition for a rehearing, had stated that the Fourth 
Amendment "'protects property as well as privacy,"'9 and that the 
property issue was "'an important and close question. "' 10 The Gov-
ernment's Reply Brief gave even less attention to Jones' s second is-
sue, rejecting out of hand the notion that installation could be a search 
or a seizure, and never even mentioning the word property. II 
Despite only passing consideration of this "property-based" 
Fourth Amendment question from the parties, the Supreme Court had 
the benefit of an amicus brief urging the Court that, if it were to grant 
the petition, it should do so because the case presented "a historic 
opportunity to reconsider the rationale for its current Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence based upon reasonable privacy expectations, and 
to restore its earlier Fourth Amendment jurisprudence based upon 
protecting both the sanctity of private property and the civil sover-
eignty of the people."I2 In short, the amicus brief urged the Court to 
discard the modem "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, and re-
7 Id. at 33. 
s Id. 
9 Id. (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty, 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992)). 
10 Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL2263361. 
11 Reply Brieffor the United States at 9-11, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-
1259), 2011WL2326714, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme _court _preview/hr 
iefs/10-1259 _petitionerreply.authcheckdam.pdf. 
12 Brief for Gun Owners of America, Inc. et. al. as Amici Curiae on Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari Supporting Neither Party at 3, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-
1259), 2011WL1881813, 
http://www.lawandfreedom.com/ site/ constitutional/USv Jones_ amicus. pdf (This ami-
cus curiae brief, the only such brief filed at the petition stage, was filed on behalf of 
neither party, rejecting Jones's position that the Petition should not be granted, and 
significantly differing with the Government's position as to why review should be 
granted. The other amici on the brief were Gun Owners Foundation, Institute on the 
Constitution, Restoring Liberty Action Committee, U.S. Justice Foundation, Con-
servative Legal Defense and Education Fund, Free Speech Coalition, Inc., Free 
Speech Defense and Education Fund, Inc., DownsizeDC.org, Downsize DC Founda-
tion, and Lincoln Institute for Research and Education). Id. 
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tum the Fourth Amendment to the textual and historic protection of 
private property. 13 On June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court granted the 
Government's petition and, in addition, directed the parties "to brief 
and argue" the property issue sought by Jones in his Brief in Opposi-
tion.14 
At the William and Mary moot court proceeding, the arguments of 
counsel, questions posed by the court, and the court's explanation of 
its decision all presumed that the case would be decided by applica-
tion of the Court's privacy test to the Government's first issue. How-
ever, that was not to be the basis on which the Jones case would be 
decided. 
II. THE TREATMENT OF THE PROPERTY ISSUE 
AT THE MERITS STAGE 
The property question-the second issue on which certiorari had 
been granted-was addressed, after a fashion, in both parties' briefs 
on the merits. The Government's opening brief trivialized the installa-
tion of the tracking device as neither a search nor a seizure-a mean-
ingless interference with Jones's "possessory interest in [his] vehi-
cle."15 The Government mentioned the word "property" three times in 
its four page analysis. 16 Jones's Brief for Respondent stressed his 
common law right to exclude others from any interference with his 
possessory interest. 17 The Government replied: "[ w ]hile the GPS de-
vice was in place, respondent remained free to use his vehicle howev-
er he wanted. He went where he wanted, he transported anyone and 
anything he wanted, and none of the operational systems of the vehi-
cle were affected in any way." 18 
Despite this one exchange, and Jones's discussion of property in-
terests generally, Jones's property claim did not play a major role in 
either party's merits brief. Rather, both parties were understandably 
preoccupied with winning their case under established Supreme Court 
13 See Id. at 7-23. 
14 U.S. Supreme Court Docket, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-1259.htm. 
15 Brieffor Petitioner at 39, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 
3561881. 
16 Brief for Petitioner at 42-46, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 
WL 3561881. 
17 Brief for Respondent at 47-48, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 
WL4479076. 
18 Brief for Petitioner at 18, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 
2011WL3561881. 
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-whether the GPS tracking device 
infringed upon Jones' s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Such was also the case in all but three of the thirteen amicus curi-
ae merits briefs filed. Ten of those briefs focused almost exclusively 
upon the Fourth Amendment privacy test. 19 Only three, filed by the 
Fourth Amendment Historians, the Constitution Project, and Gun 
Owners of America, addressed Jones' s property claim as a substantial 
one. 
20 Of these three, only the Gun Owners of America brief urged the 
revival of the Fourth Amendment text as one designed to protect the 
people's private property, rejecting the Court's revisionist "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" test. 21 
It came as no surprise that, at oral argument, counsel for the Gov-
ernment began with a citation to Katz v. United States, 22 the seminal 
modem Fourth Amendment privacy, case, stating "that visual and 
beeper surveillance of a vehicle traveling on the public roadways in-
fringed no Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy."23 What was 
surprising, however, was how quickly the property question came into 
play. Just minutes after Government counsel had come to the podium, 
19 Brieffor ACLU & ACLU of the Nation's Capital as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4802713; Brief 
for CATO Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 
10-1259), 2011WL4614426; Brieffor Ctr. on the Admin. of Crim. Law as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 
3706106; Brieffor Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4590838; Brieffor 
Council on Am.-Islamic Relations as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4614428; Brieffor Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. & 
Legal Scholars and Technical Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4564007; Brieffor Nat'l Ass'n of 
Crim. Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4614427; Brieffor Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers 
Ass'n, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-
1259), 2011WL4614423; Brieffor Rutherford Inst. & Nat'l Motorists Ass'n as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 
4826981; Brieffor Yale Law Sch. Info. Soc'y Project Scholars as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4614429. 
20 See Brief for Constitution Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respond-
ent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4614424; Brieffor Fourth 
Amendment Historians as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4642657; Brieffor Gun Owners of America, Inc. et. al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011 
WL4590837. 
21 See Brief for Gun Owners of America, Inc. et. al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondent at 8-34, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011WL4590837. 
22 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
23 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 
http ://www. supremecourt.gov/ oral_ arguments/argument_ transcripts/ 10-125 9. pdf. 
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Justice Scalia interrupted with a revealing historical "prologue" to a 
simple question: 
[W]hen wiretapping first came before this Court, we held 
that it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because 
the Fourth Amendment says that the ... people shall be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. And wiretapping just 
picked up conversations. That's not persons, houses, papers 
and effects. 
Later on, we reversed ourselves, and, as you mentioned, 
Katz established the new criterion, which is, is there an in-
vasion of privacy? Does -- are you obtaining information 
that a person had a reasonable expectation to be kept private? 
I think that was wrong. I don't think that was the original 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. But nonetheless, it's 
been around for so long, we're not going to overrule that. 
However, it is one thing to add that privacy concept to the 
Fourth Amendment as it originally ·existed, and it is quite 
something else to use that concept to narrow the Fourth 
Amendment from what it originally meant. And it seems \o 
me that when that device is installed against the will of the 
owner of the car on the car, that is unquestionably a trespass 
and thereby rendering the owner of the car not secure in his 
effects -- the car is one of his effects -- against an unreasona-
ble search and seizure. It is attached to the car against his 
will, and it is a search because what it obtains is the location 
of that car from there forward. Now, why -- why isn't that 
correct? Do you deny that it's a trespass?24 
Government's counsel readily admitted that "[i]t may be a tech-
nical trespass," but that "the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to 
protect privacy interests and meaningful interferences with possessory 
interests, not to cover all technical trespasses."25 To which, Justice 
Scalia responded: "So ... the privacy rationale doesn't expand [the 
Fourth Amendment] but narrows it in some respects."26 Fudging the 
question, counsel replied: "It changes it."27 
Just as quickly as the property/privacy issue arose it disappeared, 
as the Government counsel and various members of the Court wres-
24 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 6-7 (emphasis added). 
25 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 7, 8. 
26 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 8. 
27 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 8. 
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tied with the contours of the Court's privacy test in a search for prin-
cipled limitations on the use of modern technological developments. 28 
Although the property issue reappeared at various times in the dia-
logue between Jones's counsel and the Court, 29 Jones's property 
claim failed to come to focus as it had with Government counsel. Nor 
did the property issue reappear during Government counsel's rebut-
tal. 30 Indeed, a reading of the transcript might give rise to the impres-
sion that the Court would probably stay the course, assessing the con-
stitutionality of the GPS tracking device by the Katz privacy test, not 
by a revitalized private property one. Not surprisingly, in his recap of 
the oral argument, Lyle Denniston, a seasoned legal reporter now with 
SCOTUSblog, saw absolutely no chance for the case to be decided on 
the theory that the installation of the GPS tracking device was a tres-
pass upon private property of the kind forbidden by the Fourth 
Amendment. 31 
ID. THE SUPREME COURT REVITALIZES THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVATE PROPERTY 
PRINCIPLE 
Just two and one-half months· after oral argument, the Supreme 
Court announced its decision. Although all nine Justices voted in 
favor of Jones, the Court was divided five to four on the reasons why. 
Sticking with the modern, Katz-based "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" rationale, four Justices found in favor of Jones because "a 
reasonable person would not have anticipated" the "degree of intru-
sion" found here: "four weeks ... track[ing] every movement that 
respondent made in the vehicle he was driving."32 
The concurring Justices candidly recognized that they could not 
draw a firm line as to when GPS tracking would cross over the consti-
tutional privacy line. Indeed, they acknowledged that their test was 
"not without ... difficulties," and "involves a degree of circularity," 
which tempted ''judges ... to confuse their own expectations of priva-
28 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 9-11. 
29 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 28, 30, 36. 
30 See generally, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 57-61. 
31 Lyle Denniston, Argument recap.for GPS, get a warrant, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Nov. 8, 2011, 2:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=131423 (noting that Jones's 
attorney seemed "to get bogged down, at least early in his argument, on whether the 
police had engaged in a 'trespass' simply by putting the device on the vehicle in the 
first place. Most of the members of the Court were not notably impressed with seeing 
the case through that perspective."). 
32 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., Ginsburg, J., 
Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., concurring). 
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Justice Scalia interrupted with a revealing historical "prologue" to a 
simple question: 
[W]hen wiretapping first came before this Court, we held 
that it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because 
the Fourth Amendment says that the ... people shall be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. And wiretapping just 
picked up conversations. That's not persons, houses, papers 
and effects. 
Later on, we reversed ourselves, and, as you mentioned, 
Katz established the new criterion, which is, is there an in-
vasion of privacy? Does -- are you obtaining information 
that a person had a reasonable expectation to be kept private? 
I think that was wrong. I don't think that was the original 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. But nonetheless, it's 
been around for so long, we're not going to overrule that. 
However, it is one thing to add that privacy concept to the 
Fourth Amendment as it originally ·existed, and it is quite 
something else to use that concept to narrow the Fourth 
Amendment from what it originally meant. And it seems tp 
me that when that device is installed against the will of the 
owner of the car on the car, that is unquestionably a trespass 
and thereby rendering the owner of the car not secure in his 
effects -- the car is one of his effects -- against an unreasona-
ble search and seizure. It is attached to the car against his 
will, and it is a search because what it obtains is the location 
of that car from there forward. Now, why -- why isn't that 
correct? Do you deny that it's a trespass?24 
Government's counsel readily admitted that "[i]t may be a tech-
nical trespass," but that "the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to 
protect privacy interests and meaningful interferences with possessory 
interests, not to cover all technical trespasses."25 To which, Justice 
Scalia responded: "So ... the privacy rationale doesn't expand [the 
Fourth Amendment] but narrows it in some respects."26 Fudging the 
question, counsel replied: "It changes it. "27 
Just as quickly as the property/privacy issue arose it disappeared, 
as the Government counsel and various members of the Court wres-
24 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 6-7 (emphasis added). 
25 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 7, 8. 
26 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 8. 
27 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 8. 
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cy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz 
test looks."33 
What appeared to unite the four concurring Justices was not a 
preference for the Katz test, but their anathema toward the private 
property-based majority opinion, accusing their colleagues of "de-
cid[ing] this case based upon 18th-century tort law" for. conduct that 
might have given rise to "a suit for trespass to chattels."34 
Justice Scalia's majority opinion met this sharp critique head-on: 
That is a distortion. What we apply is an 18th-century guar-
antee against unreasonable searches, which we believe must 
provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded 
when it was adopted. The concurrence does not share that 
belief. It would apply exclusively Katz's reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test, even when that eliminates 
rights that previously existed. 35 
This exchange reveals that the five-member majority did not sub-
scribe to its opinion solely to dispose of the case before them (unlike 
the concurring opinion), but to take a first step toward restoring the 
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to its textual and historic 
foundation-a foundation rooted in the common law of private prop-
erty. 36 On this point, Justice Scalia and his four colleagues were ada-
mant; after quoting the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia observed: 
The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connec-
tion to property, since otherwise it would have referred 
simply to "the right of the people to be secure against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures"; the phrase "in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects" would have been superfluous. 37 
Immediately preceding this textual analysis, Justice Scalia ap-
pealed to history. Citing Entick v. Carrington, 38 as quoted in Boyd v. 
United States, 39 and as affirmed in Brower v. County of Inyo, 40 Justice 
33 Id. at 962. 
34 Id. at 957. 
35 Id. at 953 (italics original, bold added). 
36 For a discussion of Fourth Amendment foundational principles and their 
emphasis on property rights, see Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1606-07 (1987). 
37 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (emphasis added). 
38 Entick v. Carrington (1765), 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.). 
39 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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Scalia declared Entick to be a '"monument of English freedom' 
with regard to . . . the significance of property rights in search-and-
seizure analysis .... "41 Justice Scalia went on to quote from that de-
cision to say: 
"[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that 
no man can set his foot upon his neighbor's close without his 
leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no dam-
age at all; if he will tread upon his neighbor's ground, he 
must justify it by law."42 
In her separate concurrence, Justice Sotomayor (who also joined 
wholeheartedly with the majority) emphasized the doctrinal signifi-
cance of the majority's fresh textual and historic commitment: 
Justice Alito's approach, which discounts altogether the con-
stitutional relevance of the Government's physical intrusion 
on Jones' Jeep, erodes that longstanding protection for pri-
vacy expectations inherent in items of property that peo-
ple possess or control. ... By contrast, the trespassory test 
applied in the majority opinion reflects an irreducible con-
stitutional minimum: When the Government physically in-
vades personal property to gather information, a search oc-
curs. 43 
Having established the property principle as the base standard by 
which claims of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment are 
to be measured, Justice Scalia turned to the role that the Katz reasona-
ble-expectation-of-privacy test was to play in the future. First, he not-
ed that the test cannot "narrow the Fourth Amendment's scope."44 
Next, he explained why: "The.Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespasso-
ry test. 45 Thus, Justice Scalia's approach-in contrast to the way Jus-
tice Alito portrays it-would apply both the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test and the rekindled trespassory test. 
4o B rower v. Cnty. oflnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989). 
41 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
42 Id. (quoting Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817). 
43 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
44 Id. at 951. 
45 Id. at 952. Justice Sotomayor characterized the majority's approach as 
c~aiming that "Katz's reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test augmented, but did not 
displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test that preceded it." Id. at 955 
(Sotomayor J., concurring). 
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IV. PROPERTY PRINCIPLES PLUS JUDICIAL 
EXPEDIENCY 
Rather than expressing concern that the Jones majority's original-
ist trespassory theory was too broad, Justice Alito feared it would pro-
vide no Fourth Amendment protection against "long-term monitoring 
[if it] can be accomplished without committing a technical trespass .. 
•• "
46 Of special concern was the "vexing problems in cases involving 
surveillance that is carried out by making electronic, as opposed to 
physical, contact with the item to be tracked"47 : 
Would the sending of a radio signal to activate this system 
constitute a trespass to chattels? Trespass to chattels has tra-
ditionally required a physical touching of the property. In re-
cent years, courts have wrestled with the application of this 
old tort in cases involving unwanted electronic contact with 
computer systems, and some have held that even the trans-
mission of electrons that occurs when a communication is 
sent from one computer to another is enough. But may such 
decisions be followed in applying the Court's trespass theo-
ry? Assuming that what matters under the Court's theory is 
the law of trespass as it existed at the time of the adoption of 
the Fourth Amendment, do these recent decisions represent a 
change in the law or simply the application of the old tort to 
new situations?48 
Apparently for this reason, the four concurring justices opted for 
the "Katz expectation-of-privacy" as the sole Fourth Amendment 
test, 49 relegating "existence of a property right [as] but one element in 
determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate."50 While 
not completely confident that this privacy test would be effective in 
protecting privacy in a changing technological world, Justice Alito 
was convinced that the majority's property-based approach certainly 
would not. 51 
According to both Justices Scalia and Sotomayor, however, the 
majority's trespassory test does not displace the Katz privacy test, the 
46 Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring). 
47 Id. at 962. 
48 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 960 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984)). 
51 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962-64. 
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latter having been "added to, not substituted for, the common law 
trespassory test."52 Thus, both Justices contradicted Justice Alito's 
assumption that the majority's trespassory test would preclude utiliza-
tion of the Katz test where electronic surveillance was conducted 
without physical trespasses on a person's property. 53 To be sure, Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion acknowledges that Katz "deviated from [previous 
Court opinions'] exclusively property-based approach"54 but that does 
not mean that it "deviated" from the Fourth Amendment text. To the 
contrary, Justice Scalia makes it clear that he finds the Katz holding55 
to be consistent with the text, namely, "that the Fourth Amendment 
protects persons and their private conversations . . . . " 56 What con-
cerned Justice Scalia about Katz was that its test, 57 while derived from 
the property-based text, could be applied to narrow the Fourth 
Amendment's protection. 58 Hence, the Jones opinion is designed as a 
corrective adjustment to ensure that the privacy test does not stray 
from the "minimum . . . degree of protection it afforded when it was 
adopted. "59 
While the majority opinion seeks to marry property and privacy, 
there is considerable tension in the relationship. Justice Scalia's 
originalist return to the textual property foundation of the Fourth 
Amendment is now joined with an atextual privacy test to be em-
ployed whenever the Court chooses to use it to protect the People 
from electronic surveillance. In short, the majority endorsed a fixed 
constitutional principle supplemented by a judicially-forged pragmatic 
balancing test. 60 
The fundamental problem with the Katz test is that it is an artifi-
cial judicial construct with no connection to the Fourth Amendment. 
52 Id. at 952; id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing the trespasso-
ry test as an "irreducible constitutional minimum"). 
-
53 See id. at 953, 955. 
54 Id. at 950. 
55 Id. (observing how in Katz 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) the Court said that 
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places" thus overruling Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), where the Court held that wiretaps on 
public telephone lines were not a search under the Fourth Amendment because 
"[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants"). 
56 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951. 
57 Justice Scalia makes special note that the "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test" comes not from the majority opinion in Katz, but from Justice Harlan's 
concurrence. Id. at 950. 
58 See id. at 953 (observing that the concurring Justices would "apply exclu-
sively Katz's reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, even when that eliminates rights 
that previously existed."). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 953-54. See also Id. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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The Court did not purport to adopt privacy because of some new in-
sight or scholarship as to the original meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment in 1791. Indeed it could not have, as the seed of what has be-
come the "right of privacy" was contained in a law review article by 
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published nearly a century 
after the Fourth Amendment's ratification. 61 In that article, Warren 
and Brandeis proposed that the "next step" in the development of 
common law was to create a cause of action for violation of a person's 
"right to privacy."62-a right not then in existence (in the common 
law or as a right contemplated by the authors of the Constitution), but 
one that should be fashioned for the future. 63 Over the years, the Court 
has tried to justify the right to privacy as one of the "penumbras, 
formed by emanations from" 64 the Fourth Amendment, using the type 
of analysis which makes sense only to lawyers. 65 While the Katz rea-
sonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis has been elevated to iconic 
status, it remains divorced from its Fourth Amendment foundation, 
and its use actually endangers the protection designed by the Founders 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
While Justice Scalia's decision is exemplary-so far as it goes-
the Court has not yet come to grips with rectifying the full measure of 
damage that was done to the Fourth Amendment's protection of the 
People by the reasonable expectation-of-privacy test. The modem test 
did not just narrow the scope of the Fourth Amendment's property 
principle by overriding the common-law trespassory test, it also evis-
cerated the Fourth Amendment's protection against "searches and 
seizures" for "mere evidence" in violation of the private property in-
terests that the Fourth Amendment originally protected. It remains to 
be seen whether returning the Fourth Amendment to its property 
foundation in Jones will lead to a decision reestablishing the Fourth 
Amendment's protection of the people that, as discussed below, long 
had been known as the "mere evidence rule." 
61 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
62 Id. at 195 ("Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the 
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the 
individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone."'). 
63 Id. at 193 ("That the individual shall have full protection in person and in 
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary 
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Although there is no way to anticipate the future direction of the 
Court, a principled way of escape from the Court's simultaneous em-
brace of textual property principles and the atextual privacy test can 
be found: a complete return to the Founders' Fourth Amendment as 
generally adhered to by the Court until the late 1960s. 66 This includes 
a return to the "mere evidence rule" first comprehensively articulated 
in a seminal case that Justice Scalia cited only in passing-Boyd v. 
United States. 67 
The first provision of the Fourth Amendment limits the govern-
ment as follows: "The right of the People to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated .... " 68 From the ratification of the Consti-
tution until 1967, the mere evidence rule provided that certain types of 
searches were "unreasonable" per se, and could not be cured even by 
a warrant which met the test of the second provision of the Fourth 
Amendment. According to the Court, even search warrants: 
may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's 
house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making 
search to secure evidence to be used against him in a crimi-
nal or penal proceeding, but that they may be resorted to on-
ly when a primary right to such search and seizure may be 
found in the interest which the public or the complainant 
may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the 
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power 
renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful 
and provides that it may be taken. 69 
66 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Consti-
tutional Myths and the Case/or Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 816 (2004) ("It is 
generally agreed that before the 1960s, the Fourth Amendment was focused on the 
protection of property rights against government interference."). 
67 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (mentioning Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)). 
68 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). The second provision of the 
Fourth Amendment states: "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized." Id. 
69 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) (emphasis added), 
abrogated by Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
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The Court did not purport to adopt privacy because of some new in-
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So unquestioned was this rule, that the Boyd decision observed 
that it was not until 1863 that there even was any law in England or 
the United States: 
which authorized the search and seizure of a man's private 
papers . . . for the purpose of using them in evidence against 
him in a criminal case, or in a proceeding to enforce the for-
feiture of his property. Even the ... obnoxious writs of assis-
tance ... did not go as far as this .... 70 
The Boyd Court "noticed the intimate relation between" the 
Fourth Amendment and the prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, both of which were protected 
by the rule it adopted: 
For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in 
the [F]ourth [A]mendment are almost always made for the 
purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against 
himself .... 71 
In explaining the property principle undergirding the first free-
dom, as protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Boyd Court warned 
that, although the evidence seized in that case complied with the war-
rant requirement: 
[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first 
footing ... by silent approaches and slight deviations from 
legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by ad-
hering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the secu-
rity of person and property should be liberally construed. A 
close and literal construction deprives them of half their effi-
cacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right .... It is 
the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional 
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroach-
ments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis. 72 
Thirty-six years later, in Gouled v. United States, the Court reaf-
firmed its belief that such a rule was required "to prevent stealthy en-
croachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by 
70 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622-23. 
71 Id. at 633 (emphasis added). 
72 Id. at 635 (emphasis added) (discussing how constitutional rights can be 
slowly eroded, and what courts should do to prevent such erosion). 
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them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by well-intentioned, but 
mistakenly over-zealous, executive officers."73 Thus, the Gouled 
Court ruled: 
[S]earch warrants ... may not be used as a means of gain-
ing access to a man's house or office and papers solely for 
the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be 
d . hi 74 use agamst m .... 
In a day when "over-zealous" and increasingly militarized law en-
forcement officers make tens of thousands of "dynamic entries" into 
homes annually,75 the full scope of the people's original Fourth 
Amendment protections demonstrate the Founder's prescience. 
VI. THE KATZ PRIVACY RULE WAS BASED ON A 
REPUDIATION OF THE PROPERTY PRINCIPLE 
Six months prior to Katz, the Supreme Court had abandoned its 
well-established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence based upon proper-
73 Gouled, 255 U.S. at 304. See generally Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 
532, 544 (1897). See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914). 
74 Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added) (discussing the acceptable use 
of search warrants). 
75 See RADLEY BALKO, CATO INST., OVERKILL: THE RISE OF p ARAMILITARY 
POLICE RAIDS IN AMERICA 11 (2006), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/balko _ whitepaper _2006.pdf (indicating that in 
addition to innumerable news articles and web stories, a series of studies and popular 
books have focused renewed attention on the militarization of police and the increas-
ing use of "dynamic entry'' by SW AT teams into homes and businesses by law en-
forcement at all levels of government-estimated to be as high as 40,000 per year). 
Videos detailing abusive SW AT team raids into homes and businesses circulate wide-
ly on the Internet. See, e.g., WCCO Television Report, SWAT Team Honored for 
Raiding Wrong House, YouTUBE (July 29, 2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFnmZK15WEA (depicting a SWAT team that 
mistakenly raided the wrong home). See also Gibson Guitar Corp. Responds to Fed-
eral Raid, GIBSON (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.gibson.com/en-
us/Lifestyle/News/gibson-0825-201 l/ (observing the SWAT style entries utilized at 
the Gibson guitar factory in order to seize Indian wood that was allegedly improperly 
imported). See generally Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST 
EVERYTHING (Gene Healy, ed., CATO Inst. 2004); IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE, (Timothy 
Lynch, ed., CATO Inst. 2009); PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, 
THE TYRANNY OF GOOD INTENTIONS: How PROSECUTORS AND LA w ENFORCEMENT 
ARE TRAMPLING THE CONSTITUTION IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE, (Forum 2000); PAUL 
ROSENZWEIG AND BRIAN w. w ALSH, ONE NATION UNDER ARREST: How CRAZY 
LAWS, ROGUE PROSECUTORS, AND ACTIVIST JUDGES THREATEN YOUR LIBERTY, (Her-
itage Foundation 2010); HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: How THE 
FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT, (Encounter Books 2011 ); . 
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ty rights in favor of one rooted in an emerging right of privacy. In 
Warden v. Hayden, 76 Justice William J. Brennan-writing for a bare 
majority of five Justices-claimed dissatisfaction with the "fictional 
and procedural barriers rest[ing] on property concepts,"77 and jetti-
soned the time-honored rule that a search for "mere evidence" was 
per se "unreasonable."78 Justice Brennan claimed that the distinction 
between (i) "mere evidence" and (ii) "instrumentalities [of crime], 
fruits [of crime] or contraband" was "based on premises no longer 
accepted as rules governing the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment." 79 Discarding the notion that the Fourth Amendment requires 
the Government to demonstrate a "superior property interest"80 in the 
thing to be seized, Justice Brennan promised that his new privacy ra-
tionale would free the Fourth Amendment from "irrational,"81 "dis-
credited,"82 and "confus[ing]"83 decisions of the past, and more mean-
ingfully ensure "the protection of privacy rather than property," which 
is "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment."84 
Joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Fortas concurred in 
the result, but disagreed with "the majority's broad-and ... totally 
d. . f h 11 d ' "d ' 1 " 85 unnecessary-repu iat10n o t e so-ca e mere ev1 ence rue. 
Resting his concurrence on the long-established "hot pursuit" excep-
tion to the warrant requirement,86 Justice Fortas sought to avoid "an 
enormous and dangerous hole in the Fourth Amendment"87: 
[O]pposition to general searches is a fundamental of our her-
itage and of the history of Anglo-Saxon legal principles. 
Such searches, pursuant to ''writs of assistance," were one 
of the matters over which the American Revolution was 
fought. The very purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to 
outlaw such searches, which the Court today sanctions. I fear 
that in gratuitously striking down the "mere evidence" 
rule, which distinguished members of this Court have 
acknowledged as essential to enforce the Fourth Amend-
76 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
77 Id. at 304. 
78 Id. at 295-97. 
79 Id. at 300-01 (emphasis added). 
80 Id. at 303-04. 
81 Id. at 302. 
82 Id. at 306. 
83 Id. at 309. 
84 Id. at 304. 
85 Id. at 310 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
86 Id. at 312. 
87 Id. (emphasis added). 
UNITED STATES V. JONES 
ment' s prohibition against general searches, the Court today 
needlessly destroys, root and branch, a basic part of lib-
erty's heritage. 88 
259 
Had the Hayden Court not thrown out the "mere evidence" rule, 
no warrant could lawfully have been issued to "covertly install and 
monitor a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device on 
[Jones's] Jeep Grand Cherokee."89 According to the Government, the 
sole purpose of such an installation was to gather evidence of the 
movement of the vehicle. 90 Indeed, by introducing the data obtained 
by means of such a device, the Government was, in effect, forcibly 
collecting information about Jones' s movements for the sole purpose 
of using such data as evidence against him. Although some of the 
movements of Jones's jeep over a month-long surveillance period 
may have been seen by third parties, including Government investi-
gating agents, the very purpose of the GPS tracking system was to 
chronicle only that which Jones himself would know-all of the 
Jeep's movements over that same period. By extracting that infor-
mation via the GPS device, the Government, in purpose, and in effect, 
was compelling the defendant to testify against himself. 
Having abandoned the "mere evidence" rule for the "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" guideline, the Hayden Court opened the door 
not only to a search warrant authorizing the installation of a GPS de-
vice, but to the implantation of such a device without a search war-
rant on the theory that there is no expectation of privacy as to a per-
son's movements on a public highway. 91 Under this view, if there 
were no such privacy expectation, then the Fourth Amendment would 
cease to apply altogether, the Government having no need for proba-
ble cause or even reasonable suspicion to place a tracking device on 
any automobile or even one's clothing. 
VII. EXCHANGING PRIVACY FOR PROPERTY 
USHERS IN THE DESTRUCTIVE GENERAL WARRANT 
88 Id. (emphasis added). 
89 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 3. 
90 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 4 ("Using the device, 
agents were able to track respondent's Jeep .... "). 
91 If the Government has the right to place a GPS device on a citizen's auto-
mobile to gather movement data because no citizen has any reasonable expectation of 
privacy, why should a citizen not have a reciprocal right to place a GPS on a govern-
ment official's car? Surely the government official has no different expectation of 
privacy. No doubt, however, if any citizen were to be so bold, the Government would 
be quick to indict him, inter alia, for trespassing on government property. 
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Just as Justice Fortas forecast, Justice Brennan's privacy rationale 
has undermined the "Fourth Amendment's prohibition against general 
searches."92 The Government informed the Court in Jones "federal 
law enforcement agencies frequently use tracking devices early in 
investigations, before suspicions have ripened into probable cause."93 
As the Government also argued, applying the Fourth Amendment 
would "prevent[] law enforcement officers from using GPS devices in 
an effort to gather information to establish probable cause."94 And 
as the Government asserted, as a consequence, "the government's 
ability to investigate leads and tips," will be "seriously impede[ d]."95 
In short, the Government demanded that the Court sanction its unbri-
dled discretion to search suspected driving activities, seizing data as to 
the movement of vehicles on the public highways, in order to gather 
enough information to establish probable cause to institute criminal 
proceedings. The GPS technology, then, serves the Government in the 
same way as the discredited general warrant-legitimizing intrusions 
upon property without first having to demonstrate before a judicial 
magistrate that it has "probable cause." Indeed, if there is no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy, as the Government argued, then the war-
rant requirement would not even come into play, much less would the 
Government be required to have "probable cause," or even "reasona-
ble suspicion" to install a GPS on one's automobile. 
The expectation of privacy rationale is deeply problematic. If the 
Government were to announce and make known that it was recording 
all cell phone calls, preserving copies of all e-mails, intercepting all 
faxes, using cell phones to monitor conversations in a room even 
when no call was in progress, and that it had entered into an agree-
ment with OnStar, TomTom, and Garmin to monitor in real time the 
position of all cars using that GPS equipment, one could say that no 
American would have any reasonable expectation of privacy. Accord-
ing to the privacy theory then, no American would be able to claim 
that a Fourth Amendment search or a seizure of those communications 
or data transmissions was occurring. 
Under the reasonable expectation of privacy test the Supreme 
Court has overridden property rights by allowing warrantless searches 
of commercial property,96 and closely regulated industries,97 and a 
92 See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 312 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
93 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 23. 
94 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 23 (italics original, bold 
added). 
95 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 23 (emphasis added). 
96 See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981). 
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private residence for violations of a housing code, 98 among others. 
The Court's "expectation of privacy" test has proven wholly inade-
quate to the task of protecting the American people against invasions 
of their privacy through unreasonable searches and seizures. Paradox-
ically, a return to the text and property basis of the Fourth Amend-
ment would provide the people with the protection envisioned by the 
Fourth Amendment's authors. 
As the Boyd Court recalled, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition 
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" was the direct product of 
the government practice: 
of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue officers, em-
powering them, in their discretion, to search suspected plac-
es for smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced 'the 
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of 
English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, 
that ever was found in an English law book. "'99 
In his classic Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, renowned 
constitutional scholar, Thomas Cooley, ranked the Fourth Amendment 
guarantee of "citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of 
the Government, and protection in person, property, and papers 
against even the process of law" next in importance to the constitu-
tional ban on personal slavery. 100 
The Fourth Amendment pronounces that "persons," "houses," 
"papers," and "effects" are equally secured from unreasonable search-
es and seizures. Each is a right of the people best protected by the 
enduring, unchanging common law rules of private property, not by a 
modem privacy chameleon invented by judges. 
97 See, e.g.,NewYorkv. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987) Gunkyard); Unit-
ed States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (federal firearms dealers); Colonnade 
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (liquor industry). 
98 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
99 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (emphasis added). 
lOO THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 365 (5th 
ed. 1883) (emphasis added). 
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STUDENT SPEECH REGULATION BY 
APPLYING THE HOSTILE WORK 
ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS TO 
CYBERBULLYING 
By Carla DiBlasio* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lindsey is a sixteen-year-old sophomore who logs onto her Face-
book1 page once she gets home from school. Lindsey updates her sta-
tus and writes on her Facebook wall, "Amy is a fat cow. Don't ever 
talk to that cow, just tell her MOO." Katie is a fourteen-year-old 
eighth grade student at the same school. She decides to update her 
Facebook status after school and writes, "In case you didn't already 
know it, I'm the S*#%. Everyone else should go to hell." Are these 
instances where Lindsey and Katie are protected by their First 
Amendment free speech rights? Or, may their public school district 
punish them for their cyber speech? 
* J.D. candidate, 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
Associate Coordinator, Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet; President, Inter-
national Law Society. I offer special thanks to my sister, Christina DiBlasio, whose 
incredible strength and integrity helped to inspire the topic of this Note. I would like 
to extend additional thanks to a mentor, Beth Rankin, who always inspires grammati-
cal diligence and academic excellence. 
1 Facebook is a social networking website that is operated and privately 
owned by Facebook, Inc. In addition to other functions, users may create a personal 
profile, add other users as friends, exchange messages, and join common interest 
groups. As of December 2011, Facebook has more than 845 million active users, 
which is about one person for every eight in the world. See Facebook Fact Sheet, at 
http://www.facebook.com/press/info .php ?factsheet. 
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